Dialectics, Evaluation, and Argument

Abstract: A critical examination of the dia-lectical approach, focusing on a comparison ofthe illative and the dialectical definitions of argument. I distinguish a moderate, a strong and a hyper dialectical conception of argument. I critique Goldman's argument for the moderate conception and Johnson's ar-gument for the strong conception, and argue that the moderate conception is correct. Resume: Un interrogatoire critique sur l'approche dialectical, qui concentre sur une comparaison des definitions d'argument illatives et dialecticales. Je distingue trois conceptions de I ' argument: la moden!e, la forte, et la hyper. Je cri-tique l'argument de Goldman qui supporte la conception moderee et celui de Johnson qui support la conception forte, et je pretends que la conception moderee est exact

Meta-Argumentation in Hume’s Critique of the Design Argument

Although Hume’s critique of the design argument is a powerful non-inductive meta-argument, the main line of critical reasoning is not analogical but rather a complex meta-argument. It consists of two parts, one interpretive, the other evaluative. The critical meta-argument advances twelve criticisms: that the design argument is weak because two of its three premises are justified by inadequate subarguments; because its main inference embodies four flaws; and because the conclusion is in itself problematic for four reasons. Such complexity is quite manageable in a meta-argumentation approach

The fallacy of composition and meta-argumentation

Although the fallacy of composition is little studied and trivially illustrated, some view it as ubiquitous and paramount. Furthermore, although definitions regard the concept as unproblematic, it contains three distinct elements, often confused. And although some scholars apparently claim that fallacies are figments of a critic’s imagination, they are really proposing to study fallacies in the context of meta-argumentation. Guided by these ideas, I discuss the important historical example of Michels’s iron law of oligarchy

Mill’s On Liberty and Argumentation Theory

Chapter 2 of Mill’s On Liberty is reconstructed as a complex argument for freedom of discussion; it consists of three subarguments, each possessing illative and dialectical components. The illative component is this: freedom of discussion is desirable because (1) it enables us to determine whether an opinion is true, whereas its denial amounts to an assumption of infallibility; (2) it improves our understanding and appreciation of the supporting reasons of true opinions, and our understanding and appreciation of their practical or emotional meaning; (3) it enables us to understand and appreciate every side of the truth, given that opinions tend to be partly true and partly false and people tend to be one-sided. The dialectical component consists of replies to ten objections, five in the first subargument, three in the second, one in the third, and one general. An analysis of Mill’s argument suggests that (a) it is a contribution to argumentation theory; (b) it advocates and practices a dialectical approach; (c) its reconstruction and analysis are a contribution to argumentation theory; and (d) it raises in a striking manner the issue of the relationship between epistemology and argumentation theory

Economic Reasoning and Fallacy of Composition: Pursuing a Woods-Walton Thesis

Woods and Walton deserve credit for including (in all editions of their textbook Argument) a discussion of “economic reasoning” and its susceptibility to the “fallacy of composition.” Unfortunately, they did not sufficiently pursue the topic, and argumentation scholars have apparently ignored their pioneering effort. Yet, obviously, economic argumentation is extremely important, and economists constantly harp on this fallacy. This paper calls attention to this problem, elaborating my own approach, which is empirical, historical, and meta-argumentational

A Para-clerical Approach to the Galileo Affair and to Science vs. Religion

In 1633, the Inquisition condemned Galileo for defending Copernicus’s hypothesis of the earth’s motion and denying the scientific authority of Scripture. This ended the original controversy, but generated a new one that continues today, for example, about whether the condemnation proves the incompatibility between science and religion. Recently the Galileo affair has been studied by several scholars whom I label “Berkeley para-clericals,” chiefly philosopher Paul Feyerabend and historian John Heilbron. Their approach is distinctive: it views controversial topics involving the relationship between science and religion from a perspective that is secular-minded, but appreciative of religion, and yet conducted in the belief that such topics are too important to leave to religious believers. This approach also characterizes the work of other Berkeley para-clericals, such as Ronald Numbers on the controversy over creationism and evolutionism; they stress such attitudes as impartiality, judiciousness, and even-handedness